Libyan Political Agreement (Lpa)

http://thebandchoice.com/2019

http://honeybeebakesepping.co.uk/?et_core_page_resource=et-core-unified-cached-inline-styles58 Haftar currently enjoys growing support from international supporters such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (United Arab Emirates) and Russia[9], whether “publicly or secretly” in terms of political and military support. France has operational its aid for reasons of the fight against terrorism. [10] Some countries, mostly Western, object to the Presidential Council and the LPA recognizing the government or agreement. For the most part, there is also a gap at the international level as to the way forward. [11] However, in the West, in addition to the leaders of the GNC, there were some prominent opponents, including Mahmoud Jibrils Tahaluf, the National Front party and militias and politicians close to Abdelhakim Belhaj, the leader of the Libyan Islamic fighting group, which no longer exists. [fn] Overall, their objections focused on the composition of the Council and the belief that the institutional framework of the agreement was untenable. Interviews with Crisis Group, Tahaluf, members of the National Front, Tunis, March 2016; Former Gaddafi-era officials, Tunis, Cairo, March-April 2016.Hide the footnote Everyone often had opportunistic reasons to oppose either the agreement or the establishment of the Council. Jibril felt that the power sharing configuration was unenforceable. [fn] Jibril said he advised Kobler against preparing the deal for signature in early December 2015. He also opposed the establishment of the Council in Tripoli, as long as the city was under the control of the militias: “If you turn the money and the political power of Tripoli, [the militias] cannot distort people`s weapons for money and power.” Crisis Group interview, Rome, January 2016.Zintan`s armed groups, important military actors, although expelled from Tripoli in 2014, were divided, some agreeing to support the agreement in exchange for sharing responsibility for security in the capital, others were opposed to Haftar`s forces in the east and coordinated openly with them.

[fn] In negotiations between the Misratan and Zintani leaders from mid-2015, some Zintani armed groups agreed to support the Council, but demanded the right to return to Tripoli. This current is best represented by former Defense Minister Osama Jwehli, who said he was open to a revised agreement if the dominance of Misratan and Islamist militias in Tripoli was satisfactorily addressed. Crisis group interview, Zintan, June 2016. Another faction led by the commander of the colonel army. Idris Madi, supports Haftar; In May 2016, at an army graduation ceremony in Zintan, he received the army chief of staff of the pro-Haftar army, where he promised to “liberate Tripoli soon.” Observations, Chief of Staff Abdelrazek al-Naduri, May 24, 2016, reports in Libya al-Mustaqbal, May 24, 2016. A representative of Zintani, Omar el-Aswad, was appointed to the Council, but suspended his participation in February 2016 in protest at his cabinet appointments. Ignoring the footnote Islamists of different stripes initially rejected the Council as chosen abroad. [fn] Islamist groups across Libya followed Tripoli`s mufti, al-Sadeq al-Gharayani, who opposed the deal and accused the council of operating under the “tutelage” of foreign powers. . . .